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Abstract. We study the security of large-scale cyber-physical systems
(CPS) consisting of multiple interdependent subsystems, each managed
by a different defender. Defenders invest their security budgets with the
goal of thwarting the spread of cyber attacks to their critical assets. We
model the security investment decisions made by the defenders as a se-
curity game. While prior work has used security games to analyze such
scenarios, we propose behavioral security games, in which defenders ex-
hibit characteristics of human decision making that have been identified
in behavioral economics as representing typical human cognitive biases.
This is important as many of the critical security decisions in our target
class of systems are made by humans.
We provide empirical evidence for our behavioral model through a con-
trolled subject experiment. We then show that behavioral decision mak-
ing leads to a suboptimal pattern of resource allocation compared to non-
behavioral decision making. We illustrate the effects of behavioral deci-
sion making using two representative real-world interdependent CPS. In
particular, we identify the effects of the defenders’ security budget avail-
ability and distribution, the degree of interdependency among defenders,
and collaborative defense strategies, on the degree of suboptimality of se-
curity outcomes due to behavioral decision making. In this context, the
adverse effects of behavioral decision making are most severe with mod-
erate defense budgets. Moreover, the impact of behavioral suboptimal
decision making is magnified as the degree of the interdependency be-
tween subnetworks belonging to different defenders increases. We also
observe that selfish defense decisions together with behavioral decisions
significantly increase security risk.
Keywords: Security games · Cyber-physical systems · Human behav-
ioral decision making · NESCOR · SCADA.
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) structures can help in tackling modern and future
technical and operational challenges in different domains such as transportation,
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healthcare, digital manufacturing, and renewable energy systems. However, the
tight integration of the human, physical, and cyber components also increases
the attack surface of these systems. Facing increasingly sophisticated attacks
from external adversaries, CPS owners have to judiciously allocate their (often
limited) security budgets so as to reduce security risks. Since a CPS typically
has many legacy components, improving the security of all of them at the same
time is infeasible. This resource allocation problem is further complicated by
the fact that a large-scale CPS consists of multiple interdependent subsystems
managed by different operators, with each operator in charge of securing her
own subsystem. Examples include the power grid (energy generators, utilities,
domestic and industrial consumers, etc.) and a transportation network (federal
and state transportation agencies, private toll road operators, vehicle owners,
navigation software vendors, etc.). As a result, the security losses incurred by
each operator will ultimately depend not only on her own security investments,
but also on the decisions of other stakeholders in the CPS.
Game theory has played a key role in reasoning about such security deci-
sion making problems, due to its ability to systematically capture incentives
and optimal actions of defenders and attackers. Specifically, existing work has
modeled these scenarios as an interdependent security game [12,18,30,36,39,56].
These are a well-known class of strategic games where the security risk faced by
a defender depends on her individual security investments, the security invest-
ments by other defenders she interacts with, and the attackers’ optimal strategy
in response to these investments. However, existing work has relied on classical
models of decision making, where all defenders and attackers are assumed to
make fully rational risk evaluations and security decisions [5, 27,37].
Contrary to this focus on perfectly rational decision making for security
games, behavioral economics and psychology have shown that humans consis-
tently deviate from these classical models of decision-making. Most notably,
research in behavioral economics, an important and emerging field for which
Kahneman (in 2002) and Thaler (in 2017) won the Nobel Memorial prize in
Economic Sciences, has shown that humans perceive gains, losses and probabili-
ties in a skewed, nonlinear manner [29,38]. In particular, humans typically over-
weight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities, where this weighting
function has an inverse S-shape, as shown in Figure 1. Many empirical studies
(e.g., [20, 29]) have provided evidence for this class of behavioral models, which
form part of the foundation for prospect theory.
While a rich literature on prospect theory exists in economics and psychology,
most of the existing work studying the security of interdependent systems does
not take into account the aforementioned human behavioral decision making
effects. These effects are relevant for evaluating CPS security since decisions on
implementing security controls are not made purely by automated algorithms,
but rather through human decision making by plant managers, system operators,
or CISOs [15, 41]. Three notable exceptions where behavioral decision making
for security have been studied are [1, 26, 46]. In [1], the authors studied the
impact of probability weighting on the security investments of a single defender
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Fig. 1: Prelec Probability weighting
function which transforms true prob-
abilities p into perceived probabilities
w(p). The parameter α controls the
extent of overweighting and under-
weighting, with α = 1 indicating non-
behavioral or rational decision mak-
ing. The smaller the value of α, the
greater is the degree of mispercep-
tion.
Fig. 2: Overview of the interdepen-
dent security game framework. This
CPS consists of three interdependent
defenders. An attacker tries to com-
promise critical assets using stepping
stone attacks starting from node A.
Interdependencies between assets are
represented by edges. The red attack
path shows example of how such in-
terdependency affects the defenders.
protecting isolated assets. In [26], the authors studied the impacts of probability
weighting on certain specific classes of interdependent security games. Similarly,
[46] incorporated prospect theoretic models in the theoretical analysis of the
security of drone-based delivery systems. However, there are limitations to all
of these in the context of multi-defender interdependent CPS. First, in both
of [1,46], the authors modeled a single defender CPS system while [26] assumed
that each node is managed by a different defender, neither of which is true in
general for interdependent CPS. Moreover, prior work does not leverage human
subject experiments to demonstrate the degree of bias of decision-makers in the
behavioral models.
Our contributions:
In this paper, we study the effects of human behavioral decision making on the
security of large-scale CPS with multiple defenders. We design a reasoning and se-
curity investment decision making technique that we call BASCPS (Behavioral
Security in Cyber Physical Systems), pronounced as BASS-CPS. In such large-
scale interdependent systems, stepping-stone attacks are often used by external
attackers to exploit vulnerabilities within the network in order to reach and
compromise critical targets [22,27,50]. In stepping stone attacks, intruders com-
promise computing assets within a defended network by first gaining elevated
privileges on an asset that is at the periphery of the network. From that, the at-
tacker gains access to a connected asset and so on in a “stepping stone” manner
till some valued target deep inside the defended network is compromised. These
stepping-stone attacks can be captured via attack graphs, representing the pos-
sible paths an attacker may take to reach targets within the CPS [37]. Through
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estimating which path(s) in the attack graph the current attack is taking, the
defender can allocate the security resources appropriately. We propose a behav-
ioral security game model, consisting of multiple defenders and an attacker, in
which the interdependencies between the defenders’ assets are captured via an
attack graph. Specifically, we consider two classes of defenders.
Behavioral defenders: These defenders make security investment decisions un-
der two types of cognitive biases. First, following prospect-theoretic, non-linear
probability weighting models, they misperceive the probabilities of a successful
attack on each edge of the attack graph. Second, they have a bias toward spread-
ing their budget so that a minimum, non-zero investment is allocated to each
edge of the attack graph. This second kind of bias is motivated by behavior that
we observe in our human subject experiments.
Non-behavioral or rational defenders: These defenders make security in-
vestment decisions based on the classical models of fully rational decision mak-
ing. Specifically, they correctly perceive the risk on each edge within the attack
graph of the CPS network.
We first analyze the security investments of the decision makers in the CPS,
and compare the strategies of behavioral and non-behavioral defenders. We ob-
serve that behavioral defenders typically spread their budget throughout their
subnetwork, while non-behavioral defenders concentrate their resources on pro-
tecting the more critical edges of their subnetwork. This distinction, which is a
direct consequence of skewed risk perceptions, will result in higher overall system
loss under behavioral probability weighting, due to underinvestment in the crit-
ical parts of the system. In conducting our analysis and obtaining these insights
based on a behavioral model, we address several domain-specific challenges in
the context of security of CPS. These include augmenting the attack graph with
certain parameters such as sensitivity of edges to security investments (Equation
(1)) and the estimation of baseline attack probabilities (Table 1).
One may wonder why we need to consider human cognitive biases in se-
curity decision making. Why can we not trust ruthlessly rational optimization
algorithms which have been studied in the security context [37, 55] with such
decisions? The kinds of decision making in our target application domain of in-
terdependent CPS involves significant investments in security controls, security
policies, or changes in the system architecture. Hence, the decision making is
often done by system operators, plant managers, or security executives, albeit
with help from threat assessment tools [47,50]. Also, at Security Operations Cen-
ters (SOCs), operators make near real-time decisions about prioritizing various
security alerts. There are many articles discussing the prevalence of human fac-
tors in security decision making, both in popular press [13, 53] and in academic
journals [15, 16], none of which however shed light on the impact of cognitive
biases on the overall system security.
We perform a human subject study with 145 students to validate our behav-
ioral model and to collect model parameters. We evaluate BASCPS using two
realistic interdependent CPS and attack paths through them. The first system
is a distributed energy resource (DER) with attack scenarios developed by the
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US National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR)
working group [31]. The second system is a SCADA industrial control system,
modeled using NIST guidelines for ICS [49]. We do a benchmark comparison
with a prior solution for optimal security controls with attack graphs [47], and
quantify the level of underestimation of loss compared to the BASCPS evalua-
tion when defenders are behavioral.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. We propose a behavioral security game model for the study of security of
multi-defender CPS where defenders’ assets have mutual interdependencies.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to bring in behavioral aspects of
human decision-making to CPS security and we quantify the suboptimality
of the security budget allocations due to behavioral decision making.
2. We illustrate the effects of a prospect theoretic model of decision making
(specifically, nonlinear probability weighting) through two interdependent
real-world CPS. We also model the security-relevant aspects.
3. We analyze the different parameters that affect the security of interdepen-
dent CPS under our behavioral model, such as the available security budget,
budget distribution between defenders, types of defense mechanisms, degree
of interdependency between defenders, and sensitivity of edges. Our insights
in some cases are novel, while in other cases they run counter to prior work
with purely rational defenders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the behavioral
security game model and analyzes the differences in investment decisions be-
tween behavioral and non-behavioral defenders. In Section 3, we present human
experiments validation of our model. We evaluate the DER.1 and SCADA-based
attack scenarios in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 presents discussion
of our approach and some limitations. We discuss related literature in Section
7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Behavioral Security Games
In this section, we present our proposed model of behavioral security games,
establishing a theoretical basis that can be used to model any multi-defender
interdependent CPS. A simple example of our setup is shown in Figure 2, which
represents a system consisting of 3 interdependent defenders. An external at-
tacker, starting from node A, uses a stepping stone attack (e.g., the path of bold
edges in the attack graph) to reach the critical assets of the defenders.4 The
critical assets are those that are associated with a financial loss when compro-
mised (e.g., vm for defender 1 in the figure). Each defender aims to allocate her
security budget on the network edges in a way that safeguards the attack paths
reaching her critical assets. We formalize this scenario in this section.
4We assume that defenders perceive the attacker as non-behavioral; in reality the at-
tacker can be behavioral as well. Our assumption of a non-behavioral attacker gives
the worst case loss as a behavioral attacker may not choose the path of true highest
vulnerability due to probability misperceptions.
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2.1 Model and preliminaries
We study security games consisting of one attacker and multiple defenders in-
teracting through an attack graph G = (V, E). The nodes V of the attack graph
represent the assets in the CPS, while the edges E capture the attack progression
between the assets. In particular, an edge from vi to vj , (vi, vj) ∈ E , indicates
that if asset vi is compromised by the attacker, it can be used as a stepping
stone to launch an attack on asset vj . The default probability that the attacker
can successfully compromise vj , having compromised vi, is denoted by the edge
weight p0i,j ∈ [0, 1]. By “default probability” we mean the probability of success-
ful compromise without any security investment in protecting the assets. Each
defender Dk ∈ D is in control of a subset of assets Vk ⊆ V , and can make se-
curity investments on a subset of edges Ek ⊆ E . This is motivated by the fact
that a large CPS comprises a number of smaller subnetworks, each owned by an
independent stakeholder. Among all the assets in the network, a subset Vm ⊆ V
are critical assets, the compromise of which entails a financial loss for the corre-
sponding defender. Specifically, if asset vm ∈ Vm is compromised by the attacker,
any defender Dk for whom vm ∈ Vk suffers a financial loss Lm ∈ R+.
To protect the critical assets from being reached through stepping stone
attacks, the defenders can choose to invest their resources in strengthening the
security of the edges in the network. Specifically, let xki,j denote the investment
of an eligible defender Dk on edge (vi, vj) ∈ Ek, and let xi,j =
∑
Dk∈D x
k
i,j
be the total investment on that edge by all eligible defenders. In addition, let
si,j ∈ [1,∞) denote the sensitivity of edge (vi, vj) to the total investment xi,j .
For larger sensitivity values, the probability of successful attack on the edge
decreases faster with each additional unit of security investment on that edge.
Then, the probability of successfully compromising vj starting from vi is given
by,
pi,j(xi,j) = p
0
i,j exp
(
− si,j
∑
Dk∈D s.t. (vi,vj)∈Ek
xki,j
)
. (1)
Under this assumption, the probability of successful attack on an edge (vi, vj)
decreases exponentially with the sum of the investments on that edge by all
defenders. This probability function falls within a class commonly considered in
security economics (e.g., [8, 21]). and further enables analytical tractability of
the defenders’ decision making problem. In this context, analytical tractability
means guarantee of convexity of total loss functions (with the ability to solve
and analyze the solutions), and existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Note that any log-convex function for the probability of successful attack enables
such analytical tractability in these decision making problems [8]. Our proof in
Appendix A applies generally to any such log-convex function.
The attacker initiates attacks on the network from a source node vs (or
multiple possible source nodes), and attempts to reach a target node vm ∈ Vk,
i.e., a critical node for defender Dk. Let Pm be the set of all attack paths from
vs to vm. We assume the worst-case scenario, i.e., the attacker exploits the most
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vulnerable path to each target5. Mathematically, this can be captured via the
following total loss function for Dk,
C¯k(xk,x−k) =
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm
(
max
P∈Pm
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
pi,j(xi,j)
)
. (2)
Each (rational) defender Dk minimizes C¯k(xk,x−k) in (2), which is the sum
of losses of all of Dk’s critical assets, subject to her total security investment
budget Bk, i.e.,
∑
(vi,vj)∈Ek x
k
i,j ≤ Bk. Note that xk and x−k are the vector of
investments by defender Dk and defenders other thanDk, respectively. Our setup
corresponds to a single-shot game where the defender moves first and spends all
her security budget, after which the attacker moves. This investigation can serve
as a foundation for future work on multi-shot games, where significant additional
complexities will arise, including the need to create realistic models of human
decision making in dynamic security games.
2.2 Behavioral probability weighting
Behavioral economics and psychology literature has shown that humans consis-
tently misperceive probabilities by overweighting low probabilities, and under-
weighting high probabilities [29,43]. More specifically, humans perceive a “true”
probability p as probability w(p), where w(·) is known as a probability weighting
function. A commonly studied functional form for this weighting function was
formulated by Prelec in [43], and is given by
w(p) = exp
[
− (− log(p))α
]
, p ∈ [0, 1], (3)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter that controls the extent of misperception. When
α = 1, we have w(p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1], which corresponds to the situa-
tion where probabilities are perceived correctly, i.e., a non-behavioral defender.
Smaller values of α lead to a greater amount of overweighting and underweight-
ing, as illustrated in Figure 1.
We now incorporate this probability weighting function into the security
game of Section 2.1. In a behavioral security game, each defender misperceives
the attack success probability on each edge according to the probability weight-
ing function in (3). Substituting (3) in the total loss function (2), a behavioral
defender Dk chooses her investments xk to minimize her perceived total loss
Ck(xk,x−k) =
∑
vm∈Vk
Lm
(
max
P∈Pm
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
w (pi,j(xi,j))
)
, (4)
subject to her budget constraint
∑
xki,j ≤ Bk. Note that w (pi,j(xi,j)) is the
perceived attack probability on the edge (vi, vj) with total investment xi,j . The
total loss function Ck(xk,x−k) given by (4) is convex (see proof in Appendix A).
5Our formulation also captures the case where each defender faces a different attacker
who exploits the most vulnerable path from the source to that defender’s assets.
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vs v1
v2
v3
v4 v5
L5 = 1
(a) An attack graph with a min-cut
edge.
v1
v2
v3
v4
L4 = 1
(b) An attack graph with a cross-
over edge.
Fig. 3: The attack graph in (a) is used to illustrate the sub-optimal invest-
ment decisions of behavioral defenders. The attack graph in (b) is used in the
human subject experiment to isolate the spreading effect.
A set of security investments by the defenders is said to be a Pure Strategy
Nash Equilibrium (PNE) if no defender can improve her utility by unilaterally
changing her investment [34]. The concept of PNE is widely used to determine
the course of action among multiple players in a non-cooperative setting. In this
paper, we study the security outcomes of the system at the PNE of the above
game, and how those outcomes vary with the behavioral probability weighting
parameter α. Note that Nash equilibrium is also relevant for behavioral setups,
since mistaken probability judgments of behavioral players do not necessarily
imply limited strategic reasoning.
To find these Nash equilibria, we use the notion of best response dynamics [24],
where the investments of each defender Dk are iteratively updated based on the
investments of the other defenders. For our behavioral security game, in each
iteration, the optimal investments for defender Dk can be calculated by solving
the convex optimization problem in (4). For our experiments, we run the best
response dynamics until they converge to a Nash equilibrium [27], and then study
the security outcomes at that equilibrium.
Our model can also capture the effects of learning by the human subjects as
they proceed through multiple rounds of the game (in each round, each defender
plays the single-shot game, allocating all her security budget). The model for
defender Dk in a multi-round defense game can be captured by our model in
(4) with αk(i) as the behavioral level in round i. While it may be expected that
learning will move a subject toward a more rational model, i.e., αk(j) > αk(i) for
j > i, we find in practice that this is not the case for all subjects (Section 3.1).
2.3 Motivational example
We provide a simple example to illustrate the investment decisions by behavioral
and non-behavioral defenders, and provide some intuition on why the optimal
defense strategies under the two decision-making models differ. In this section,
we use the notion of a min-cut of the graph. Specifically, given two assets s and
t in the graph, an edge-cut is a set of edges Ec ⊂ E such that removing Ec from
the graph also removes all paths from s to t. A min-cut is an edge-cut of smallest
cardinality over all possible edge-cuts [54]. As the example will show, the optimal
investments by a non-behavioral defender (i.e., α = 1) will generally concentrate
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the security investments on certain critical (i.e., min-cut) edges in the network.
In contrast, behavioral defenders tend to spread their budgets throughout the
network.
Consider the attack graph shown in Figure 3a, with a single defender D and
a single target asset v5 (with a loss of L5 = 1 if successfully attacked). Let the
defender’s budget be B, and let the probability of successful attack on each edge
(vi, vj) be given by pi,j(xi,j) = e
−xi,j (assuming p0i,j = 1). This graph has two
possible min-cuts, both of size 1: the edge (vs, v1), and the edge (v4, v5). The
total loss function (2) for the defender is given by
C¯(x) = max
(
e−(xs,1+x1,2+x2,4+x4,5), e−(xs,1+x1,3+x3,4+x4,5)
)
which reflects the two paths from the source vs to the target vt. Note that an
optimal solution of a constrained convex optimization problem satisfies the KKT
conditions [23]. One can verify (using KKT conditions [23]) that it is optimal for
a non-behavioral defender to put all of her budget only on the min-cut edges,
i.e., any solution satisfying xs,1 + x4,5 = B and x1,2 = x2,4 = x1,3 = x3,4 = 0 is
optimal. The intuition of the above result is that for a non-behavioral defender,
the probability of successful attack on any given path is a function of the sum of
the security investments on the edges in that path. Thus, any set of investments
on min-cut edges would be optimal since the sum of investments would be the
whole security budget on each path of the graph.
Now consider a behavioral defender, i.e., a defender with α < 1. With the
above expression for pi,j(xi,j) and using Prelec function (3), we have w(pi,j(xi,j)) =
e−x
α
i,j . Thus, the total loss function (4) for a behavioral defender is
C(x) = max
(
e−x
α
s,1−xα1,2−xα2,4−xα4,5 , e−x
α
s,1−xα1,3−xα3,4−xα4,5
)
,
which includes the two paths from the source vs to the target v5. Again, one can
verify (using the KKT conditions [23]) that the optimal investments are
x1,2 = x2,4 = x1,3 = x3,4 = 2
1
α−1xs,1.
xs,1 = x4,5 =
B−4x1,2
2 =
B
2+4(2
1
α−1 )
.
Comparing these two cases, the optimal investments of the non-behavioral
defender yield a total loss of e−B , whereas the investments of the behavioral
defender yield a total loss of e−2
α
α−1
e
− B
1+2
α
α−1 , which is larger than that of the
non-behavioral defender.
Interpretation: The reason for this discrepancy can be seen by examining
the Prelec probability weighting function in Figure 1. Specifically, when con-
sidering an undefended edge (i.e., whose probability of successful attack is 1),
the marginal reduction of the attack probability on that edge as perceived by a
behavioral defender is much larger than the marginal reduction of true attack
probability on that edge. Thus the behavioral defender is incentivized to invest
some non-zero amount on that edge. Therefore, a behavioral defender splits her
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investments among the two non-critical sub-paths in the attack path. Note that
the same insight holds for different baseline probabilities, but this shifting ef-
fect is greater when the slope of the behavioral probability weighting curve is
higher (i.e., close to values of 1, 0, or where the cross-over happens between
the behavioral curve and the diagonal). A rational defender, on the other hand,
correctly perceives the drop in probability, and thus prefers not to invest on the
non-critical sub-paths, instead placing her investment only on the critical edges
(vs, v1) or (v4, v5) or both.
2.4 Motivational Example with different sensitivities
In the above example, we assumed all edges have the same sensitivity to invest-
ments. In cases where critical edges have equal or higher sensitivity than non-
critical edges, the same insight as above holds. Specifically, when edge (vi, vj)
has sensitivity si,j , one can verify (using KKT conditions) that the optimal in-
vestments by a behavioral defender are given by
x1,2 = x2,4 = x1,3 = x3,4 = 2
1
α−1
(
si,j
ss,1
) α
1−α
xs,1.
xs,1 =
(
ss,1
s4,5
) α
1−α
x4,5; x4,5 = B −
∑
∀(i,j)6=(v4,v5)
xi,j .
The insight here is that the investment decision has two dimensions: behavioral
level and sensitivity ratio of non-critical edges to critical edges. Specifically, as
the defender becomes more behavioral, she puts less investments on edges with
higher sensitivity.
2.5 Spreading nature of security investments
We augment our model with another aspect of behavioral decision making, which
we call spreading. Such a behavioral defender spreads her defensive investments
on all edges throughout the attack graph, even when some edges are highly
unlikely to be exploited for attacks. Our use of spreading is inspired by Na¨ıve
Diversification from behavioral economics [10], where humans have a tendency
to split investments evenly over the available options. This phenomenon has not
been reported earlier for security decision making, to the best of our knowledge,
and we infer this behavior from our human subject study. We capture this effect
by adding another constraint to our model in (4): for each defender Dk, we set
xki,j ≥ ηk, where ηk is the minimum investment the defender makes on any edge.
The value ηk = 0 gives us the behavioral decision with no spreading, i.e., with
only behavioral probability weighting.
3 Human Subject Experiments
To validate our behavioral security model, incentivized experiments were con-
ducted on 145 students in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Labora-
tory at Purdue University. Subject demographics are presented in Appendix B.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 11
Fig. 4: Histogram of human subjects’
investments on the critical edge. The
vertical red lines show the optimal
allocations at specific behavioral lev-
els (α).
Fig. 5: Average of all subjects’ in-
vestments on the critical edge vs ex-
periment rounds. The upward trend
indicates that on average, subjects
are learning.
Fig. 6: Histogram of human subjects’
investments on the cross-over edge.
The vertical red lines show the opti-
mal allocations at specific spreading
levels (η).
Fig. 7: Average of all subjects’ in-
vestments on the cross-over edge vs
experiment rounds. There is only a
weak downward trend in spreading
behavior.
Subjects participated in the role of a defender, and allocated 24 discrete defense
units over edges in each network. Subjects made their decisions on a comput-
erized interface, and faced 10 rounds for each network, receiving feedback after
each round indicating whether the attack was successful or not (i.e., whether
the valuable asset was compromised). Subjects received comprehensive written
instructions on the decision environment that explained how their investment al-
location mapped into the probability of edge defense, and what was considered
a successful defense. Subjects received a base payment of $5.00 for their partic-
ipation. In addition, we randomly selected one round from each network and if
the subject successfully defended the critical node in that round she received an
additional monetary payment.
3.1 Network (A) with critical edge
This human experiment is on a network similar to Figure 3a, except that there
is only one critical edge (v4, v5) i.e., vs = v1. Figure 4 shows the average invest-
ment allocation to the critical edge, based on 1450 investment decisions (i.e.,
10 decisions from each of the 145 subjects). It shows the proportion of subjects
who are non-behavioral (those at the vertical red line of α = 1, 27%), as well as
heterogeneity in α, with observations further to the left being more behavioral.
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Subjects to the left of the α = 0.4 line (approximately 10 units allocated to the
critical edge) are not necessarily exhibiting α < 0.4. Those who allocate between
5 and 10 units to the critical edge could have a strong preference for spreading.
Those who allocate less than 5 units to the critical edge cannot be explained
by a strong preference for spreading, as there are 24 units in total to be spread
over 5 edges. These subjects are probably using some other unidentified decision
heuristic. Figure 5 shows the mean of subjects’ investments in each round. After
round 4, the average investment on the critical edge in each round is higher
than the initial amount of investment in round 1. The average increase summed
across the 10 rounds is one defense unit. This means that subjects become less
behavioral on average through learning. However, looking beyond the average,
we note that individuals can be divided into three categories depending on their
learning through rounds. The first category makes worse decisions in later rounds
(26.90% of the subjects), the second category exhibits no learning (40.69%), and
the third category improves their investments (32.41%).
3.2 Network (B) with cross-over edge
This experiment used the attack graph from Figure 3b. This attack graph is
suitable to separate the spreading behavioral bias from the behavioral probability
weighting, since for any 0 < α ≤ 1, the optimal decision is to put zero defense
units on the cross-over edge (v2, v3). Figure 6 shows the average investment
allocation on the cross-over edge based on 1450 investment decisions. We see
that the proportion of subjects that are non-behavioral, i.e., invest nothing on
the cross-over edge, is 29%. Figure 7 shows the average of subjects’ investments
on the cross-over edge in each round, which shows a weak downward trend.
Taken together, these human experiments provide support for our behavioral
model with the probability weighting and spreading factors.
4 CPS System A: Distributed energy system
In this section, we use our proposed model to evaluate the security outcomes of a
practical CPS. Specifically, we examine the effect of different system parameters
on the degree of suboptimality of security outcomes due to behavioral decision
making.
4.1 DER.1 system description:
The US National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR)
Technical Working Group has proposed a framework for evaluating the risks of
cyber attacks on the electric grid [31]. A distributed energy resource (DER) is
described as a cyber-physical system consisting of entities such as generators,
storage devices, and electric vehicles, that are part of the energy distribution sys-
tem [31]. The DER.1 failure scenario has been identified as the riskiest failure
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Fig. 8: Attack graph of a DER.1 failure scenario adapted from [27]. It shows
stepping-stone attack steps that can lead to the compromise of PV (i.e., G0)
or EV (i.e., G1). There are two defenders whose critical assets are G0 and
G1, while G is a shared critical asset.
scenario affecting distributed energy resources according to the NESCOR rank-
ing. Here, there are two critical equipment assets: a PhotoVoltaic (PV) generator
and an electric vehicle (EV) charging station. Each piece of equipment is accom-
panied by a Human Machine Interface (HMI), the only gateway through which
the equipment can be controlled. The DER.1 failure scenario is triggered when
the attacker gets access to the HMI. The vulnerability of the system may arise
due to various reasons, such as hacking of the HMI, or an insider attack. Once
the attacker gets access to the system, she changes the DER settings and gets
physical access to the DER equipment so that they continue to provide power
even during a power system fault. Through this manipulation, the attacker can
cause physical damage to the system, and can even lead to the electrocution of
a utility field crew member.
To analyze the above system within our behavioral security game model,
we follow the model proposed by [27], which maps the above high level system
overview into an attack graph as shown in Figure 8. We generate the attack graph
using the CyberSage tool [50], a Cyber Security Argument Graph Evaluation tool
for CPS security assessment. In this attack graph, node labels starting with “w”
are used to denote the non-critical assets/equipment used as part of the attack
steps, and G0, G1, and G represent the critical assets which are the attacker’s
goals. For the attacker’s goals, G0 represents a physical failure of the PV system,
G1 represents a physical failure of the EV system, and G means that a failure
of either type has occurred. The goal G may signify non-physical losses (e.g.,
reputation losses) for the DER operator as a result of a successful compromise.
The first defender is responsible for defending the critical asset G0, the second
defender for defending G1. Both defenders share the common asset G.
4.2 Experimental setup:
Each edge in the attack graph in Figure 8 represents a real vulnerability. To
create the baseline probability of attack on each edge (i.e., without any security
investment), we first create a table of CVE-IDs (based on real vulnerabilities
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Table 1: Baseline probability of successful attack for vulnerabilities in DER.1
and SCADA failure scenarios.
Vulnerability (CVE-ID) Edge(s) Attack Vector Score
DER.1 application
Physical access (CVE-2017-10125) (w9, w7),(w18, w16) Physical 0.71
Network access (CVE-2019-2413) (w9, w8),(w18, w17) Network 0.61
Software access (CVE-2018-2791) (w7, w6),(w8, w6) Network 0.82
Sending cmd (CVE-2018-1000093) (w6, w5),(w15, w14) Network 0.88
SCADA application
Control Unit (CVE-2018-5313) (Vendor,Control1),(Vendor,Control2) Local 0.78
Remote authentication (CVE-2010-4732) (S, Vendor) Network 0.9
Remote cmd injection (CVE-2011-1566) (Control,RTU1),(Control,RTU2) Network 1.0
Authentication bypassing (CVE-2019-6519) (Corp,DMZ1),(Corp,DMZ2) Network 0.75
reported in the CVE database for 2000-2019), with each CVE-ID representing
one possible method for exploiting the vulnerability. We then followed previous
works in [25,58] to convert the attack’s metrics (i.e., attack vector, attack com-
plexity, and need of authentication [35]) to a baseline probability of successful
attack. Table 1 illustrates the process.
We next explore the effects of behavioral decision making on the system’s
security. Specifically, we measure the total system loss, given by the sum of
the losses experienced by the two defenders in the system. Loss only accrues if
G0, G1, or G are compromised. We assume that the total budget available at
the defenders’ organization is B, and that an amount BT of this budget is set
aside for security investments. We refer to BT < 0.2B, 0.2B < BT < 0.6B,
and BT > 0.6B, as low, medium, and high security budgets, respectively. For
our numerical simulations in this failure scenario, we set B = $20. For most
of our simulations, we vary α ∈ [0.4, 1] which is consistent with the range of
behavioral parameters from prior experimental studies (e.g., [2, 20]) as well as
from our user study. We observe that the same insights hold for α ∈ (0, 0.4)
(e.g., in the baseline comparison in Figure 9). This is expected since the form of
the probability weighting function does not change as α decreases.
4.3 Results and insights
Experiment A.1: Baseline comparison: We begin by comparing BASCPS
with the seminal work of [47] on attack graph generation and investment deci-
sion analysis. In [47] the defense mechanism is to select the minimal set C of
edges that, if removed from the attacker’s arsenal, will prevent her from reach-
ing the target asset (there can be multiple sets in case of non-uniqueness). This
is equivalent to our min edge-cut. More recent approaches (e.g., [19, 59]) con-
ceptually follow the same strategy for security investment with attack graphs.
We compare [47] with loss under both behavioral and non-behavioral defense
placements in BASCPS. We compare the two methods in Figure 9 by calculat-
ing the ratio of total system loss estimated under the method of [47] over that
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Fig. 9: The ratio of loss estimated by
[47] to the (true) loss estimated by
BASCPS for different behavioral lev-
els, with η = 0.
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Fig. 10: The ratio of loss estimated
by [47] to the (true) loss estimated by
BASCPS for different spreading lev-
els, with α = 1.
estimated by BASCPS. Note that the defense investments given by BASCPS
for non-behavioral defenders is identical to that determined by [47]. However, if
indeed investment decisions are made by subjects with human decision making
biases, prior work will underestimate the loss in the system. The degree of un-
derestimation can be as high as 3.34X in DER.1 and 3.57X in SCADA and that
degree is inversely related to the value of α. Figure 10 compares the system loss
for rational defenders vs that determined by BASCPS under different spread-
ing levels by behavioral defenders. The under-estimation is as high as 8.33X for
DER.1 and 826X for SCADA and that degree is directly related to the value of
η.
Experiment A.2: Choice of defense mechanism. Next, we compare the
security outcomes under two potential defense mechanisms. The first defense
mechanism is individual defense, in which each defender can spend her security
budget only on the edges connecting assets inside her subnetwork. In the previ-
ous experiment, we have only considered these types of individual investments.
An alternative to this defense mechanism is joint defense, where each defender
can choose to spend her security budget on any edge in the network (i.e., she
can choose to help defend the subnetworks of other defenders). Figure 11 illus-
trates that a joint defense mechanism always outperforms the individual defense
mechanism. The advantage of joint defense is higher under asymmetric budget
allocation among the defenders. Further, the improvement under joint defense
holds with both behavioral and non-behavioral defenders. A good example of
this is that if both defenders are non-behavioral, and defender 1 has only 20% of
the total security budget, the joint defense mechanism decreases the total loss
by 88.5% over the individual defense mechanism. Also, under the same budget
allocation, if both defenders are behavioral with α1 = α2 = 0.6, the joint defense
mechanism decreases the total loss by 81.2% over individual defense.
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We observe that the
joint defense mechanism
can outperform the indi-
vidual defense scenario,
particularly at higher
budget asymmetry.
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As SR increases, the
increase in investments
on NC edges is slower
for behavioral defenders.
We also note that two behavioral defenders who cooperate can, despite their
suboptimal decisions, achieve a lower total loss compared to two non-behavioral
defenders making individual defense decisions in the asymmetric budget setup.
For instance, from Figure 11, we observe that two defenders with a high degree
of behavioral decision making (i.e., α1 = α2 = 0.6) will attain a lower total loss
than two non-behavioral defenders with selfish decisions when the budget asym-
metry is 40:60 or greater. This is explained by the fact that enabling cooperative
defense allows the defender with higher budget to put part of her excess security
budget as security investment on the other defender’s subnetwork. It therefore
has considerable potential in mitigating the effects of suboptimal behavioral de-
cision making.
Experiment A.3: Interdependency among different defenders. We next
study the effects of the degree of interdependence among the defenders on the
system’s security. In the DER.1 failure scenario, the degree of interdependency
increases if the HMI of the PV and the EV are communicating. Therefore, mak-
ing any progress in the attack steps towards one device affects the other device as
well (e.g., having software access to the PV enables sending commands to either
the PV or the EV). This is represented in Figure 8 by introducing additional
edges interconnecting the “w” nodes from the two different sides of the network.
Figure 12 illustrates that as the number of interdependent edges between the
two defenders increases, the total system loss increases in both non-behavioral
and behavioral security games. Further, we observe that the degradation is more
pronounced under behavioral decision making. For instance, suppose there are
12 interdependent links among the two defenders (i.e., the PV and EV HMIs are
communicating at all levels). If both defenders are behavioral with α1 = α2 =
0.6, the total system loss increases by 1230% over the case of 2 interdependent
links. This increase is smaller (500%) when the defenders are non-behavioral.
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The insight behind these differences is that as the number of interdependent links
increases, the number of paths between the source and target nodes increases
as well. In this case, behavioral defenders will increasingly spend their budget
suboptimally on the criss-crossing edges instead of optimally investing on the
critical edges, leading to higher losses.
Experiment A.4: Sensitivity of edges to investments. We next consider
the effects of different sensitivities of edges to security investments. Recall that
higher sensitivity edges are those for which the probability of successful attack
decreases faster with each unit of security investment. We show the result in Fig-
ure 13 by using as the independent variable the ratio of sensitivity of non-critical
to critical edges. First, assume critical edges correspond to mature systems that
are already highly secure and difficult to secure further. For our model, this
translates to high (resp. low) si,j for non-critical (resp. critical) edges. We ob-
serve that as the sensitivity ratio increases, all defenders put more investments
on the non-critical edges, but the increase is slower in behavioral defenders. How-
ever, lower sensitivity ratio will result in investing almost all budget on these
critical edges, even for behavioral defenders.
5 CPS System B: SCADA Control System
We next evaluate BASCPS on the SCADA system in Figure 14. We provide a
subset of the evaluations here; the remainder, which provide identical insights
to DER.1 are in Appendix D.
5.1 SCADA system description:
The SCADA system (in Figure 14) is composed of two control subsystems, where
each incorporates a number of cyber components, such as control subnetworks
and remote terminal units (RTUs), and physical components, such as, valves
controlled by the RTUs. This system is architected following the NIST guidelines
for industrial control systems [49]. For example, each subsystem is separated from
external networks through a demilitarized zone (DMZ). The system implements
firewalls both between the DMZ and the external networks, as well as between
the DMZ and its control subnetwork. Therefore, an adversary must bypass two
different levels of security to gain access to the control subnetworks.
Mapping this system to our proposed security game model, each control
subnetwork is owned by a different defender. These two subsystems are interde-
pendent via the shared corporate network, as well as due to having a common
vendor for their control equipment. The resulting interdependencies map to the
attack graph shown in Figure 15. The “Corp” and the “Vendor” nodes connect
the two subnetworks belonging to the two different defenders and can be used
as jump points to spread an attack from one control subsystem to the other.
A critical node has the loss amount denoted within the node (“L = X”). We
consider external attackers who attempt to gain access to the RTUs through
attacks initiated from either the corporate network or the vendor network. The
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Fig. 14: A high level network overview of a SCADA-based system, adapted
from [27] consisting of two control subnetworks. These two subnetworks are
interdependent due to sharing a common vendor for their control network
and RTUs, and through their common connection to the corporate network.
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Fig. 15: The attack graph for a SCADA-based control network, adapted from
[27]. The attacker’s starting node is S. Each target node has an associated
loss (denoted as L within the node).
corporate network “CORP” is owned by both defenders. The compromise of a
control network “CONTROL i” leads to loss of control of all 3 connected RTUs.
Now, we present our simulations of failure scenario of Scada system with
studying some important parameters in the behavioral security game.
5.2 Experimental Setup:
Similar to the DER.1 system, the choice of baseline probability of attack is also
based on CVE vulnerabilities (Table 1). The choice of the budget levels has
a similar intuition as the DER.1 failure scenario, but differs in values due to
the increased number of critical assets in this attack graph. Specifically, in this
section, BT = $10 and $20 reflect low and moderate budgets, respectively, and
BT ≥ $30 reflects high budgets.
5.3 Results and insights
Experiment B.1: Comparison with the DER.1 attack graph. Figure 16
shows the effect of behavioral probability weighting on the total system loss with
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two behavioral defenders. Comparing Figure 16 with Figure 19 shows that the
relative difference in total loss between non-behavioral and behavioral defenders
is much higher in the SCADA network compared to the DER network. This is
due to more interdependencies between the two defenders in the SCADA attack
graph– 4 edges per defender in SCADA compared to 1 in DER. Also, there are
more critical assets per defender in SCADA, as all assets (firewalls, control units,
and RTUs) are critical. In general, tighter interdependencies among defenders
imply that behavioral decision making is going to be more damaging.
Experiment B.2: Number of critical assets. Here we consider scaling
up the SCADA system, with each defender owning more physical assets and
correspondingly having a larger number of RTUs. We make replicas of these
RTUs for each defender, and assume that the defender has the same security
budget BT = 25, done to measure the effect of suboptimal decisions as the CPS
size grows. Again, we notice that as the number of RTUs increases, the difference
between system loss with behavioral players versus non-behavioral players is
magnified as shown in Figure 17. For instance, we observe that when α = 1, a
change from 3 RTUs per player to 18 RTUs per player yields a relative increase
of 344% in system loss, while the same change with α = 0.4 results in a higher
increase of 882%. As the size of the CPS grows, the budget stays constant and
hence the magnitude of the loss increases. As the decision becomes behavioral,
at large CPS sizes, the scarce defense budget is improperly allocated and this
magnifies the loss. The impact of behavioral decisions is more damaging here
than in the DER case because of the highly critical edges between the control
network and the RTUs. A non-behavioral defender protects these critical edges,
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but a behavioral one mistakenly distributes her budget between these and other
edges.
Experiment B.3: Choice of defense mechanism. As in the DER system,
we observe the merits of cooperation (i.e., joint defense) in decreasing the total
loss to the defenders (Figure 18). The effect is more pronounced for a higher
degree of behavioral bias of the defenders. For example, at moderate budget
(BT = 20), the relative decrease in total system loss due to joint defense at
α1 = α2 = 0.4 is 25% while α1 = α2 = 0.8, the decrease is lower (10%). Thus,
as the defenders exhibit higher degree of cognitive bias, it is more advantageous
to adopt joint defense mechanisms.
Experiment B.4: Centralized defense merits. Next, we compare the out-
comes of decentralized decision-making by two defenders with a centralized de-
fense method where a central planner owns both subnetworks and aims to min-
imize the system loss by allocating the budget appropriately. We observe that
when the defenders have a symmetric budget, the outcomes of central and dis-
tributed planning coincide. As the budget asymmetry increases, the difference
between the two defense methods increases as well. Figure 21 (in Appendix D)
shows this trend for two budget choices, BT = 10 and BT = 20. We observe that
with the lower budget, the suboptimality due to selfish decision making is more
pronounced. Further, we observe that interventions by a social planner have a
higher benefit when the defenders are behavioral. In particular, when BT = 10,
the relative difference between social and selfish for α = 1 is 5.7%, while it is
higher (14%) for α = 0.6.
6 Limitations and Discussion
Guiding security decision-makers: Here we have studied the impacts of hu-
man behavioral decision making on the security of an interdependent system. We
believe this opens up a new dimension of intervention in securing interdependent
systems. How does one guide security decision makers to the appropriate levels
of behavioral weighting for a given system? How does one incentivize multiple
stakeholders to cooperate to achieve greater system-level security? What is the
role of a central regulatory agency in incentivizing the security-beneficial invest-
ments by individual stakeholders? In this context, the insights gained from our
analysis would be useful for configuring real-world systems with optimal param-
eter choices. For example, following the result of Fig. 11, we can start to quantify
the benefit of joint defense relative to individual defense by each defender.
We can also quantitatively show the decision maker the improvement in sys-
tem security (under various systems conditions) when moving from her cur-
rent (sub-optimal) investments to that given by a (rational) algorithm (e.g.,
BASCPS with α = 1 or [47]). In contrast to the line of work that studied plac-
ing response actions solely based on the system admin’s intuition (e.g., [32,48]),
BASCPS solves a rigorous convex optimization problem (4) to determine how
to distribute the mitigation actions across the critical edges.
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Human subject experiments: The use of student subjects as opposed to
security professionals is for practical reasons, as it is difficult to collect enough
number of security professionals at one time and place for a controlled experiment
and importantly, it would be very expensive to incentivize such professionals with
monetary payments. For reference, the average payment a subject earned for the
two networks described plus the participation fee was $10.93. Although, we think
that students (with instructions) are proxying for general “human” performance,
it should be noted that they are (most likely) not the best case performers.
On the other hand, the empirical evidence of differing behavior of professional
(of a relevant field) and student subject pools is mixed. There are cases where
behavior differs in an expected way, with professionals being less biased than
students. However, more generally the biases found in student subject pools
do exist in professional subject pools.6 In our environment, we anticipate that
security professionals exhibit higher levels of rational behavior relative to our
subject experiment. However, even small deviations from rationality can result
in sub-optimal security investments that are empirically important due to the
magnitude of losses associated with compromised ‘real-world’ assets.
Loss aversion: In addition to misperceptions of probabilities, empirical evidence
shows that humans perceive utilities and losses differently than simple expected
values. In particular, humans avoid uncertain outcomes and overweight losses
compared to gains (loss aversion). A richer behavioral model, cumulative prospect
theory [28], incorporates these aspects. However, in our setting, this richer model
does not significantly change the total loss function of the defenders. Specifically,
the attack on an asset is either successful or it is not. If the reference total
loss is zero for each asset (i.e., without a successful attack), then the index of
loss aversion only scales the loss Lm by a scalar constant without changing the
optimal decision on the investments.
Uncertainty in estimation of probability of successful attacks: In our
evaluation, we have assumed that each defender has a correct probability assess-
ment (i.e., p0i,j is estimated correctly). However, there are practical scenarios in
which this assumption does not hold. In this context, we should note that the
behavioral decision making affects the problem of resource allocations even un-
der such uncertainty. We provide a brief discussion and analysis of such scenario
in Appendix E.
Multi-hop dependence: In several cybersecurity scenarios, the ease of an at-
tacker in achieving an attack goal depends not just on the immediate prior attack
step but on steps farther back. In such scenarios, the simpler formulation of using
probabilities on each edge and assuming independence of the events of traversing
the different edges can lead to inaccurate estimates. However, we follow several
prior works (e.g., [37,55]) that leveraged the property that in most cases, a node
has the highest dependence on the previous node, in order to build computa-
tionally tractable analysis tools. Moreover, to handle this issue in our model, we
introduce the notion of k-hop dependence whereby the probability of reaching a
6See Part IV, in Chapter 17, [17] for a survey and discussion on this topic.
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particular node depends not just on the previous hop node, but nodes up to k
hops away. We provide a brief discussion of such setup in Appendix F.
7 Related Work
Security in interdependent systems: The problem of securing systems with
interdependent assets has been handled in several prior works [37,55]. The com-
mon theme is that a successful attack to one asset may be used to compromise
a dependent asset. The notion of attack graphs [25] is a popular abstraction for
capturing the security interdependencies. The specific works differ in what the
assets are (physical or virtual, resource-constrained nodes, networking assets,
etc.), the level of observability into the states of the assets, and the probabilis-
tic reasoning engine used. Our work here differs from these works in that the
prior work creates algorithms to make the security control decisions, while we
are considering humans with cognitive biases making these decisions.
Game-theoretic modeling of security: Game theory has been used to de-
scribe the interactions between attackers and defenders and their effects on sys-
tem security. A commonly used model in this context is that of two-player games,
where a single attacker attempts to compromise a system controlled by a single
defender (e.g., [33,40,45,51,57]). Game theoretic models have been further used
in [9, 56] to study the interaction between one defender and (multiple) attack-
ers attempting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Our work differs
from both lines of literature in that we consider the interdependencies between
multiple defenders in the network.
Game theoretic models for the study of CPS security have been proposed
in [42, 60]. The authors in [60] proposed a Stackelberg game model, in which a
defender attempts to maintain high performance in a SCADA control system
against cyber attacks launched by fully rational jammers. The work in [42] pro-
posed a single-defender game-theoretic approach to minimize loss due to attacks
in water distribution networks. However, these works have not taken into account
the interdependencies between multiple defenders.
Lastly, the major difference of our work with all aforementioned literature
is that existing work has focused on classical game-theoretic models of rational
decision making, while we analyze behavioral models of decision making. No-
table departures from classical economic models within the security and privacy
literature are [3, 4], which identify the effects of behavioral decision making on
individual’s personal privacy choices using human subject experiments without
exploring rigorous mathematical models of players behavior. The importance of
considering similar models in the study of system security has been recognized
in the literature [14]. To the best of our knowledge, the only study that provides
a theoretical treatment of behavioral decision making in certain specific classes
of interdependent security games is [26]. That research, however, is theoretical in
scope and does not consider the more realistic attack scenarios that we consider
here.
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Human behavior in security: A large body of literature has considered mod-
els from behavioral economics in the context of security applications, such as
internet security and information security, via psychological studies; see [6] for
survey or through human subject experiments [7,44]. Our work differs from these
in that we explore a rigorous mathematical model of defenders’ behavior, model
the interaction between multiple defenders (in contrast to the study of only one
defender for all of these studies), and consider interdependent assets (in contrast
to these studies which reason about binary decisions on isolated assets).
8 Conclusion
We studied behavioral security games to evaluate the effects of human behavioral
decision making on the security of large-scale CPS with multiple defenders. We
compared the strategies of behavioral and rational defenders, where behavioral
defenders exhibit nonlinear probability weighting and a tendency to spread se-
curity investments across assets. We observed that behavioral decision makers
tend to allocate their budget across the network, while non-behavioral decision
makers concentrate their budget on critical edges. We presented two real case
studies of interdependent CPS: a distributed energy resources system and a
SCADA-based control network. We studied the effects of several game parame-
ters including the defense budget availability and distribution, and collaborative
defense mechanisms, on the security risks of the system in the presence of be-
havioral decision making.
We find that the suboptimal pattern of resource allocation by humans ex-
hibiting behavioral decision making characteristics can considerably increase the
security risks of interdependent CPS, with the suboptimality becoming more
pronounced under moderate security budgets. Using better security risk eval-
uations and expert input (which can alter the patterns of behavioral decision
makers toward rational decision making) can ultimately lead to improvements
of CPS security. A complementary approach is to enable collaborative defense
strategies, or centralized planning, which can lead to a reduction in security risks
even with behavioral decision making.
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Appendix
A Convexity of the Total Loss Function
Lemma 1. Let the probability successful function pi,j(xi,j) be twice-differentiable
and log-convex. Then, the total loss function in (4) is convex.
Proof : We drop the subscript i, j in the first part of this analysis for better
readability. Now, beginning with the probability weighting function defined in
(3), we have
w(p(x)) = exp
[
− (− log(p(x)))α
]
= (g ◦ h)(x),
where g(x) = exp(−x) and h(x) = (− log(p(x)))α. we prove that h(x) is concave:
h′(x) = −α(− log(p(x)))α−1 p
′(x)
p(x)
h′′(x) = α(α− 1)(− log(p(x)))α−2 (p
′(x))2
(p(x))2
+ α(− log(p(x)))α−1
[
(p′(x))2 − (p(x))(p′′(x))
(p(x))2
]
.
Since 0 ≤ p(x) ≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ − log(p(x)) ≤ ∞ for all x. Moreover, 0 < α ≤ 1
and thus the first term in the R.H.S. of h′′(x) is negative. Also, since p(x) is
twice-differentiable and log-convex, (p′(x))2 < (p(x))(p′′(x)) [11], which ensures
that the second term is also negative. Therefore, h(x) is concave. Since g(x) is
convex and non-increasing while h(x) is concave, w(p(x)) is convex.
Now, with the total loss function defined in (4), w(pi,j(xi,j)) is convex (as
shown above). Since w(pi,j(xi,j)) is monotone, thus
∏
(vi,vj)∈P
w(pi,j(xi,j)) is con-
vex [11]. Moreover, the maximum of a set of convex functions is also convex [11].
Finally, since the total loss function Ck(xk,x−k) is a linear combination of con-
vex functions, the total loss function defined in (4) is convex. That concludes
the proof.
B Human Experiments Details
Human Experiments Demographics: The 145 human subjects in our exper-
iment are comprised of 78 males (53.79%) and 67 females (46.21%). They belong
to various majors on campus, with the three largest being Management/Business
(24.8%), Engineering (24.2%), and Science (23.5%). Regarding year in college,
6.9% are 1st year, 13.1% are 2nd year, 21.38% are 3rd year, 35.86% are 4th year,
and 22.76% are graduate students. Regarding the GPA distribution, 44.83% have
GPAs between 3.5 and 4, 35.17% between 3 and 3.5, and 17.93% between 2.5
and 3.
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Fig. 19: Total loss as a function
of the security budget. The adverse
effects of behavioral decision mak-
ing are most severe with intermedi-
ate budgets. At either high or low
budgets, the amount of the bud-
get, rather than its allocation, deter-
mines security.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Number of Defenders
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
To
ta
lS
ys
te
m
Lo
ss
Fig. 20: Total loss as a function of
the number of defenders. We ob-
serve that the loss increases super-
linearly (i.e., the per-defender loss
is increasing as the CPS grows).
This is due to the increased risks
resulting from interdependencies in
the defenders’ critical assets.
C DER.1 Extended Results
Experiment A.5: Amount of security budget. We next consider the system
defense, and vary the available total security budget for defending the DER
system, under symmetric budget distribution between the two defenders. Figure
19 shows the effect of behavioral decision making on the security level of the
DER system as a function of the total budget. We observe that the effect of
behavioral decision making with intermediate security budgets (i.e., BT = 5
and BT = 10) is more severe than both very low budget (i.e., BT = 1) and very
high budget (i.e., BT = 20). For instance, with BT = 1, the total loss when both
defenders are behavioral with α1 = α2 = 0.6 has a relative increase of 1.11%
over a system in which both defenders are non-behavioral, while at BT = 5 and
BT = 10, a similar change in behavioral levels yields a higher increase of 12.41%
and 28.24% in the total loss, respectively.
This effect can be intuitively interpreted by noting that with a low security
budget, all defenders suffer mainly due to the scarcity of protection resources,
and are less affected by how their budget is distributed. At very high budgets on
the other hand, the total loss experienced by both behavioral and non-behavioral
decision makers is very close to zero (since the probabilities of successful attack
on each edge decrease exponentially with the amount of investment on that edge),
and thus suboptimal investment decisions do not have a considerable impact
on overall security. In other words, we observe that judicious (non-behavioral)
investments are most crucial in determining the security of the system when the
allocation, rather than the amount, of the security budget is the deciding factor
in determining risks.
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Experiment A.6: Number of defenders. We create a network with multiple
defenders where we make replicas of these two subnetworks, and assume that
each new installed equipment corresponds to a new defender’s subnetwork. We
consider a symmetric distribution of the security budget over all defenders, with
each defender having a security budget of $10. We notice in Figure 20 that as
the number of defenders increases, the difference between total losses between
non-behavioral and behavioral games increases in a super-linear manner. For
instance, we observe that when the number of defenders is 4, a change from
non-behavioral to behavioral defenders (α = 0.6) increases the loss by 8.65%,
while the same change in α in the larger network with 16 defenders results in
a higher increase of 26.17%. This phenomenon is due to the interdependencies
between the subnetworks. For instance, if there are two defenders, each will incur
a loss in two cases: when either her target asset is successfully compromised or
the other defender’s target asset is successfully compromised (as it can lead
to the compromise of their common goal G). On the other hand, if there are
16 defenders, for each defender, there are 16 possible paths through which she
suffers a loss. This also explains why the total loss in the system increases with
increasing number of defenders—the individual budget of each defender stays the
same but the number of ways in which her asset can be compromised increases
linearly.
Experiment A.7: Asymmetry in budget distributions. We next analyze
the effect of asymmetric budget distribution in the two-defender network facing
an attacker. The total security budget is $10. Figure 11 illustrates the total loss as
a function of the fraction of defender 1’s budget. For the individual-defense loss
(solid lines), we observe that the suboptimality of behavioral decision making is
more pronounced with higher budget asymmetries. For example, if defender 1 has
20% of the total budget, the relative increase in total loss from α = 1 to α = 0.4
is 25%. In contrast, the same change of α when the budget is symmetric results
in only a 6% relative increase in the total loss. This observation can be explained
by two facts. First, with suboptimal behavioral allocation, the poorer defender
wastes even her constrained budget on non-critical edges. Second, the richer
player also allocates her resources suboptimally. This leads to this magnified
relative increase in losses under budget asymmetry.
D Scada Extended Results
Experiment B.5: Amount of security budget. Figure 16 shows the effects
of budget availability on system security. We observe that for moderate budgets,
behavioral decision making increases the total loss up to 60% over non-behavioral
decision making. On the other hand, with high budgets (BT ≥ 30 in our simula-
tions), behavioral decision making has a negligible effect on the total loss, which
is very close to zero. The intuition is similar to that in Section 4: the negative
effect of behavioral decision making is more pronounced with moderate budgets
as the allocation of the security budget for protecting the different assets is most
critical.
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Fig. 21: A comparison of expected
losses between centralized and dis-
tributed decision making. Social
planning is most effective under
moderate total budget and high bud-
get asymmetry between the defend-
ers, and when the defenders are be-
havioral.
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Fig. 22: The percentage of invest-
ments on non-critical (NC) edges
vs the sensitivity ratio (SR) between
non-critical to critical edges, for dif-
ferent α in the SCADA attack graph.
As SR increases, the increase in in-
vestments on NC edges is slower for
behavioral defenders
Experiment B.6: Interdependency among different defenders. As in the
DER system, we again observe effect of interdependency between defenders on
the security of the SCADA system. We consider medium budget choice (i.e.,
BT = 25) for this experiment. In the SCADA system, the degree of interde-
pendency increases if assets from one subnetwork can access assets in the other,
without going through the Corporate or Vendor nodes. For example, if the at-
tacker gets access to Control unit 1, this enables her to compromise RTU2 as
well, in addition to RTU1. Figure 23 illustrates this effect—as the number of
interdependent edges between the two defenders increases, the total system loss
increases in both non-behavioral and behavioral security games. The highest
level of interdependency is when there are two edges between DMZ1 and DMZ2,
between Control1 and Control2, and the controller to the 3 RTUs of the other
defender. An example of this phenomenon is that if both defenders are non-
behavioral and the level of interdependency is the highest, the total system loss
is higher by 462% over the case of the lowest level of interdependency (2 inter-
dependent links). We also see that as the interdependency between the different
defenders increases, the suboptimal security decisions have greater adverse im-
pact on the total system loss.
Experiment B.7: Sensitivity of Edges to Investments. In this experiment,
we repeat the sensitivity sweeping analysis of Experiment A.7 for the SCADA
attack graph. The investments under different sensitivity ratios are shown in
Figure 22, with insights similar to those explained for the DER.1 attack scenario.
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Fig. 23: The effect of increasing the
degree of interdependency on the to-
tal system loss (effect is more pro-
nounced when the degree of behav-
ioral decision making is higher).
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Fig. 24: Percentage of relative dif-
ference in total system loss due to
uncertainty for DER.1 failure sce-
nario.
E Uncertainty in Attack Probability
Recall that in our evaluation, we have assumed that each defender has a cor-
rect probability assessment (i.e., p0i,j is estimated correctly). However, there are
practical scenarios in which this assumption does not hold (see Section 6). Here,
we analyze the effectiveness of behavioral decision making when uncertainty is
taken into account. In other words, when probabilities in the attack graph can-
not be simply assumed correct. We model such uncertainty by replacing p0i,j in
(1) with q0i,j where q
0
i,j ∼ N (p0i,j , σ) where σ is the standard deviation (uncer-
tainty) of the probability of attack. The interesting question that we answer
here is: How well does behavioral decision making compare to rational decision
making when true attack graph edge values are uncertain? In our experiments,
we varied σ from 0 to 0.3 with the restriction of 0 < q0i,j ≤ 1 since it is a proba-
bility. Figure 24 shows the percentage of relative difference in total system loss
due to uncertainty for DER.1 failure scenario for the different uncertainty levels.
Note that rational defenders have much lower relative loss since they put most
investments on critical edges. On the other hand, the effect is higher for moder-
ate and highly behavioral defenders (i.e., 0.4 ≤ α ≤ 0.6) since such uncertainty
shifts the probability to different regions in Figure 1. The same insights holds
for SCADA system. We remove the details of SCADA uncertainty experiments
in the interest of space. This shows that even if the probability of successful
attack is not estimated perfectly, the rational behavior (which is the security
investments placed by α = 1) gives more accurate estimation of the expected
system loss compared to the decisions with behavioral biases.
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Fig. 25: The attack graph in (a) is converted to the attack graph (b) to consider
2-hop dependency whereby the probability of reaching v5 depends on which
path is used.
F Multi-hop dependence
To handle the multi-hop dependence (mentioned earlier in Section 6) in our
model, we introduce the notion of k-hop dependence, whereby the probability
of reaching a particular node depends not just on the previous hop node, but
nodes up to k hops away. The value of k is a specification provided by the security
admin, either for the entire graph or for individual nodes.
BASCPS handles this type of dependencies by considering all paths of length
ki ending at node i. Specifically, let this set of paths be Pi. Then the original
attack graph is converted to one where node i has |Pi| incident edges with a
splitting of the previous node into multiple virtual nodes if needed. The different
probabilities on the different edges capture the relative ease of an attacker to
reach i through the different paths. We show an example of this in Figure 25b
which is created from attack graph in (a) in which node v5 has 2-hop dependence,
say because if the attacker has come to v4 through v2, then her job is easier than
if she has come through v3. There are 2 paths; correspondingly, the previous
node v4 is split into two virtual nodes v
a
4 and v
b
4. For the example case of the
upper path being easier, pva4 ,v5 > pvb4,v5 . This same approach can be used when
the dependence is not on contiguous nodes, but on a decision taken early on
in the attack path, by splitting into multiple paths. One subtle consideration
is that when there is a security investment on an edge of the original attack
graph, that should be mirrored on all the edges that have been derived from
that edge. One potential problem with our approach is that it blows up the size
of the attack graphs. The helpful factor here is that most nodes have only 1-hop
dependence in practice and this property has been leveraged in the past to build
computationally tractable analysis tools [37,52,55].
